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0.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The Globalisation Process and its Drivers 
 
• Globalisation is a process whereby national economies become more 
integrated and more interdependent.  Over the last 30 years economic 
activity has become ever more globalised, driven by rapid increases in 
international trade, cross-border investment, financial market integration 
and cross-border migration. 
 
• International trade has grown rapidly since the end of World War II and 
total trade in goods and services now exceeds $11,000 billion per annum.  
Trade growth has consistently outstripped the growth of production 
resulting in economies becoming ever more open and interdependent.  
This growth has been fuelled by declining costs of cross-border 
transactions and communications and falling trade barriers. 
 
• Cross-border investment has also grown dramatically and total foreign 
direct investment stocks worldwide exceed $8,000 billion.  Total sales of 
the affiliates of multinational enterprises worldwide are now almost 
$20,000 billion annually.  Reductions in capital controls, falling 
communications costs and development of new technologies have 
combined to make it easier to do such business internationally. 
 
• The widening and deepening of capital markets has supported trade and 
investment flows.  Although the centre of gravity for these markets is still 
overwhelmingly London and New York, markets are deepening elsewhere, 
especially in the Far East. 
 
• Cross-border migration contributes to the globalisation process by 
transferring workers to parts of the world where they are in greater demand 
and wages are higher.  Labour movements are subject to more 
impediments than capital movements.  Nonetheless, significant numbers 
continue to relocate each year and help build the kinship networks that 
sustain trade and investment. 
 
 China and India in the Global Economy 
 
• China and India are both experiencing high rates of economic growth and 
as their exports growth exceeds output growth, they are also integrating 
into the global economy very rapidly. 
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• Between 1990 and 2004 China’s and India’s exports outstripped the 
growth of world exports by a factor of 3.5 and 1.5 respectively.  By 2004, 
China accounted for 6.5 per cent of total world merchandise exports and 
2.6 per cent of global services trade; in India the relevant shares were 0.8 
per cent and 1.6 per cent.  China is already the world’s fourth largest 
exporter and is forecast to be its largest by 2010.   
 
• In both countries exports are concentrated mainly in labour intensive 
products and standardised processes.  But upgrading into higher value-
added and more skill-intensive processes is already occurring, with strong 
export growth in transportation equipment, chemicals, industrial 
machinery and consumer electronics. 
 
• China and India also represent huge potential markets and import growth 
has been significant.  In 1990 the ratio of imports to GDP in China was 
14.3 per cent and in India 8.6 per cent; by 2003 these had grown to 31.8 
per cent and 16.0 per cent respectively.  A significant proportion of these 
imports are raw materials, capital goods and intermediates for export 
oriented industries. 
 
• At present OECD markets account for more than half China’s imports and 
almost two-thirds of its exports.  The US is its biggest export market and 
the EU its biggest source of imports.  Under 40 per cent of India’s imports 
originate from, and exports are directed at, OECD countries.  The EU is its 
biggest source of imports and market for exports.  The UK’s share of 
imports in both countries has declined over the last decade. 
 
• As China has opened up, it has become something of a magnet for inward 
investment.  For much of the 1990s, 10 per cent of foreign direct 
investment went there, since 2000 it has been closer to 6 per cent.  India 
attracts far less by way of FDI, only about 1 per cent of the global total.  
Neither country is as yet a major source of FDI, though that is likely to 
change over the next decade or so. 
 
Challenges to the East Midlands Economy 
 
• The pace of change required to adjust to globalisation will accelerate with 
the emergence of China and India.  In the longer run this will contribute to 
increased living standards.  However, adjusting to globalisation is not 
painless and will pose a range of challenges for the East Midlands 
economy. 
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• Direct competition from imports represents a very obvious threat to 
enterprises and workers, especially in the manufacturing sector, which 
remains important to the regional economy.  Here the most acute threat is 
likely to be faced in garments, textiles, engineering goods and metals. 
 
• The ICT revolution has facilitated a worldwide growth in outsourcing and 
this is one business strategy for dealing with direct import competition.  
But outsourcing clearly has the potential to displace jobs from the East 
Midlands and China and India are major hosts to outsourced activities.  
Moreover, this is not just a threat to manufacturing but also to finance and 
business services. 
 
• A further challenge comes from direct export competition.  Exporting is 
important to the region, accounting as it does for over 20 per cent of gross 
value added.  The emergence of China and India as major exporters clearly 
poses a significant competitive threat to East Midlands exports in third 
markets. 
 
• Inward investment is an important source of jobs and wealth creation but 
has declined in importance in the East Midlands in recent years.  Because 
China and India, especially the former, are proving to be such magnets for 
FDI, the possibility clearly exists that investment that might otherwise 
have come to the East Midlands will be displaced. 
 
Opportunities for the East Midlands Economy 
 
• Growth of production, employment and income per capita in two such 
highly populated economies as China and India will offer a range of 
opportunities to enterprises and their workers in the East Midlands. 
 
• The most obvious opportunity is in the form of direct exports.  A large 
proportion of both countries’ imports is in intermediate inputs of, for 
example, machinery, transport equipment and electrical equipment, in all 
of which there is production capacity in the East Midlands.  Agriculture 
and processed foodstuffs are also important to the region but currently 
have restricted access in China and India.  As these markets are liberalised, 
opportunities will open up.   
 
• Outsourcing is an opportunity as well as a challenge.  Enterprises often 
come under pressure because labour costs per unit of output increase to a 
point where not all stages of production can be sustained.  Rather than see 
a production process disappear in its entirety, where fragmentation is a 
possibility, increasing engagement with China and India offers 
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opportunities for East Midlands based businesses to outsource specific 
stages of production. 
 
• China is accumulating substantial trade surpluses, most of which are being 
invested in short run financial assets.  As the economy develops it is 
certain that, like Japan before, it will invest surpluses in FDI.   
 
• In a mirror image of investment in China, which seeks to take advantage of 
abundant and cheap unskilled labour, investment from China is likely to 
seek opportunities in skilled labour intensive and technology intensive 
activities.  The UK has for long been the most important host to inward 
investment in the EU, much of it export platform FDI targeting the broader 
European market.  Chinese enterprises are likely to find its attributes 
equally attractive and the East Midlands needs to be alert to these 
opportunities. 
 
• Rapid import penetration has already triggered defensive trade action in 
the European Union, recent voluntary export restraints on Chinese 
garments and the upsurge in anti-dumping actions being cases in point.  
These may increase the attractiveness of barrier jumping FDI into the UK. 
 
Supporting Adjustment to Globalisation 
 
• Adjusting to global sources of change and developing new economic 
activities or new ways of supporting existing activities have some similar 
policy requirements.  Evidence suggests that policies and institutions that 
support and accommodate rather than frustrate and resist change are 
altogether more successful. 
 
• A lot of what underpins and sustains an environment conducive to 
adjustment is determined at the national level, for example:  a stable 
macroeconomic environment; institutions which encourage flexibility in 
product and labour markets; good transport and communications systems 
and so on.  In addition, however, there is a role for regional policy. 
 
• Since foreign direct investment is footloose, there is considerable 
competition between nations and regions to attract it.  Targeted marketing 
and support can have an impact on location.  Gaining an edge in attracting 
a larger share of the UK’s inward investment will be a major challenge for 
the East Midlands. 
 
• The focus for regional policy should be to:  help make East Midlands 
labour markets and businesses more flexible and adaptable; promote 
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greater skills and technology upgrading; shape infrastructure and 
institutions in ways that promote exporting and inward investment; 
provide better information about market opportunities in China and India; 
promote stronger commercial links with China and India. 
 
• Some of these challenges can be addressed via existing infrastructure, for 
instance by reviewing the focus of and investment in promoting the 
region’s skill agenda.  Others should identify and exploit assets that are 
distinctive to the region. 
 
• The East Midlands’ large Asian communities are potentially a very 
valuable asset, given the role of kinship and networks in promoting trade 
and investment.  These communities offer potentially valuable market 
intelligence, points of entry and commercial conduits. 
 
• The region is also home to a large number of higher education institutions 
(HEIs) that, apart from offering support for human capital development 
and knowledge transfer, also attract Chinese students in very large 
numbers.  One of the local HEIs even has a branch campus in China.  
There is an untapped asset here for developing commercial ties. 
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1. CONTEXT AND OVERVIEW 
 
Globalisation is a process whereby national economies become more integrated 
and therefore more interdependent.  The final quarter of the twentieth century was 
a period that witnessed a dramatic increase in globalisation, which in turn raised 
its visibility.2  It figures prominently in public discourse, whether in the form of 
debates about ‘fair’ trade, the power of multinational corporations or migration of 
labour.  For most governments worldwide, the globalisation process is now a 
major focus for public policy. 
 
At times the urgency around globalisation debates suggests the phenomenon is 
something novel or new.  It is not.  Globalisation processes have been an integral 
feature of economic development for millennia, let alone centuries.  Moreover, 
overall these processes have been to the benefit of mankind.  There is a substantial 
body of academic and policy focused research that demonstrates convincingly a 
long run connection between globalisation and economic growth.  Recent 
economic history reinforces this, good examples being the growth enhancing 
impact of the integration of the former Soviet bloc countries into the world 
economy and the stimulus to growth provided by liberalisation in many (though 
not all) developing countries.3 
 
However, as globalisation processes unwind, not everyone benefits to the same 
extent or at the same time.  Put differently, there are adjustment frictions and it is 
generally these frictions that underpin disagreements and disputes about 
globalisation.4  Frictions arise because globalisation results in resources being 
reallocated from one activity to another and this process is not costless.  Workers 
can become unemployed or may have to retrain to gain employment in expanding 
industries.  Evidence suggests that the costs associated with these frictions are a 
small fraction of overall gains.  That does not, however, mean that there is not a 
policy challenge to be confronted. 
 
Although globalisation is not a new phenomenon, there are two particularly 
distinctive features of the current wave through which we are living.  First, the 
speed of change is more rapid than in the past, due to the information, 
communications and technology (ICT) revolution.  Second, because economies 
are more open, more people are (directly or indirectly) affected by the process.  
With the rapid emergence of China and India, two huge continental economies, 
the pace of change is likely to accelerate and given the sheer size of these 
                                                          
2 The Handbook of Economic Globalisation Indicators (OECD 2005) defines a range of globalisation 
indicators and their measurement. 
3 For an analysis of long run trends, see N. Crafts (2004).  For recent experience of developing 
countries, see D. Greenaway, C. W. Morgan and P.W. Wright (2002). 
4 Well known critiques and defences of globalisation are J. Stiglitz (2002) and M. Wolf (2004) 
respectively. 
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economies, more countries, more people and more enterprises will be affected.  
Adjustment issues will become more rather than less central to economic activity 
and political discourse.  It follows that there is a need to think more carefully 
about the policy environment most conducive to exploiting the benefits of 
globalisation and minimising its costs of adjustment. 
 
We begin this Report with an appraisal of the globalisation process.  This will 
embrace both a documentation of trends in trade, cross-border investment and 
migration and an evaluation of the key drivers of the process.  In Section 3 we 
then focus specifically on the emergence of China and India.  Here we look at 
both their current role in the world economy and probable development of that 
role in the coming decade.  In Section 4 we shift the focus to the East Midlands 
economy and ask what challenges it faces in adjusting to direct competition from 
Chinese and Indian imports as well as the potential pressures associated with 
indirect competition through for example, outsourcing.  But of course there are 
major commercial opportunities associated with the development of China and 
India and in Section 5 we appraise these, with particular reference to the East 
Midlands.  Section 6 reviews adjustment policy and Section 7 concludes.. 
 
 
2. THE GLOBALISATION PROCESS AND ITS DRIVERS 
 
One can naturally think of economic globalisation and non-economic 
globalisation.  The latter refers, for example, to cultural integration resulting from 
an increasingly globalised media.   These will not feature in this Report; we focus 
only on economic globalisation. 
 
Economic globalisation refers to the process of international economic 
integration:  economic activity between individuals, corporate bodies and 
governments across national boundaries, which results in greater interdependence.  
In other words, economic welfare at home becomes more sensitive to 
developments in economies overseas.  The key drivers of economic globalisation 
are international trade, cross-border investment, financial market integration and 
cross-border migration, all of which have accelerated in recent decades. 
 
International Trade 
 
Table 1 reports key indicators of international trade for the most recent year for 
which World Trade Organisation (WTO) data is available, 2004.   
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Table 1:  Recent Trends in Trade 
 
Value of Trade (2004)  
  Merchandise $8,907 billion 
 Services $2,125 billion 
  
Growth of Merchandise Trade  
 1950-73 7.0% per annum 
 1974-90 4.0% per annum 
 1990-03 7.3% per annum 
  
Growth of Services Trade  
 1990-00 6.5% per annum 
 2001-03 10.5% per annum 
Source:  World Trade Report 2005 (WTO, Geneva 2005) 
 
Several points are notable.  First, the level of merchandise exports was over 
$8,900 billion and that of services exports over $2,100 billion.  To benchmark 
this, UK GDP was under $1,900 billion in 2004.  If anything, these data understate 
the level of international trade, partly because of gaps in the coverage of services 
trade and partly because they take no account of counter-trade, i.e. barter of goods 
and services with no explicit financial recording of the transaction taking place.  
The WTO estimates the latter as being equivalent to around 20 per cent of total 
recorded trade. 
 
As we can see, total trade has grown consistently since the end of World War II 
and at consistently high rates.  In fact there are only two years since 1950 when 
trade has failed to grow.  Note also that services trade is growing more rapidly 
than merchandise trade.  From an economic standpoint, the really important point 
to note, as shown in Table 2, is the fact that the growth of trade has consistently 
outstripped growth of production.  Clearly if trade growth exceeds output growth, 
economies must be becoming more open and this is indeed the case.5 
 
Growth in trade is due to a combination of factors.  First, man-made barrier, in 
particular tariffs, which act as a friction have declined steadily over the past fifty 
years.  This is partly due to periodic Rounds of multilateral trade liberalisation 
orchestrated by the WTO and its predecessor, the GATT.  It is also due to the fact 
that many countries, especially developing countries and transitional economies, 
have undertaken unilateral liberalisation.  As a consequence (average) tariffs are at 
historically low levels of around 5 per cent in the main OECD countries; 
somewhat higher still in developing countries.  Non-tariff barriers, such as 
                                                          
5 A detailed breakdown of trade by region and commodity can be found in the WTO’s International 
Trade Statistics, which is published annually. 
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quantitative restrictions, voluntary export restraints and anti-dumping measures, 
have not declined as dramatically as tariffs and this is an area that periodic WTO 
Rounds of trade talks (like the current Doha Round) continue to target.   
 
Second, alongside this decline in man-made barriers, there has been an even more 
dramatic decline in natural barriers as costs of transporting goods and services and 
communications costs have plummeted.  This is partly due to infrastructure 
improvements and partly to the ICT revolution. Technological development more 
generally has also promoted trade in that it has facilitated the fragmentation of 
production processes and increased outsourcing of activities, resulting in increased 
trade in intermediate goods and services, which in turn is directly linked to the 
development of multinational enterprises and growth of cross-border investment. 
 
Cross-border Investment 
 
In Table 3 we set out the key headlines relating to trends in foreign direct 
investment over the last quarter of a century.  Several points are notable.  First, 
FDI flows have increased dramatically over this period, whether we take inflows 
or outflows.  However, as is apparent from this data, there is a degree of volatility 
from one year to the next and for this reason FDI stocks are widely regarded as a 
more reliable indicator.  As we can see, these have increased around twelve-fold 
over the period and for both inflows and outflows.  Inward and outward stocks 
were almost $9,000 and $10,000 respectively in 2004.  This growth in FDI is 
obviously closely associated with the growth of multi-national enterprises 
(MNEs), which have been major engines of the globalisation process.  These 
enterprises have become so important that it is estimated that foreign affiliate sales 
total close to $20,000 billion per annum (in other words almost twice the total 
value of merchandise and services trade worldwide) whilst their total assets 
exceeded $36,000 billion in 2004. 
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Table 2:  Selected Long-Term Trends 
 
World merchandise trade and production by major product group, 1950-03 
(Average annual percentage change in volume terms)     
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Table 3:  Trends in FDI ($bn) 
 
 1980 1990 2000 2004 
FDI Inflows 55 209 1,388 648 
  Developed Country % 
 Developing Country % 
84 
16 
82 
17 
80 
18 
65 
27 
FDI Outflows 54 242 1,187 730 
 Developed Country % 
 Developing Country % 
92 
6 
93 
6 
91 
9 
93 
6 
FDI Inward Stocks 693 1,950 6,090 8,902 
 Developed Country % 
 Developing Country % 
66 
30 
72 
28 
66 
30 
69 
30 
FDI Outward Stocks 559 1,758 5,983 9,732 
 Developed Country % 
 Developing Country % 
89 
11 
93 
7 
86 
14 
89 
11 
Source:  World Investment Report 2005 (UNCTC, New York, 2005) 
 
A second point to note is that developed countries continue to be the major 
sources of and hosts to FDI.  That said, they are more important as sources than 
hosts; which is what we would expect as capital tends to flow from capital rich to 
capital poor countries.  Moreover, their relative importance as hosts has declined 
in recent years.  Thus, whereas in 2004 developed countries still accounted for 93 
per cent of global FDI outflows, they only accounted for 66 per cent of inflows.  
This is partly due to the surge in inward investment into China and India, 
especially the former.  It is also worth noting that the UK is a key source of, and 
host to, FDI and has been for a long time.  In a European context it is the pre-
eminent host, routinely accounting for more than a third of the EU’s total inward 
investment.  A combination of a liberal investment environment, London’s capital 
markets and the English language have contributed to this. 
 
Some of the drivers of the growth in FDI are similar to the drivers of growth in 
trade.  For example, transactions costs have fallen with reductions in capital 
controls and costs of communication.  The latter, combined with technological 
development, has underpinned the rapid growth of MNEs and associated growth 
in offshoring.  It is likely that the growth of FDI will be sustained and that China 
and India’s role will increase as hosts, but given the huge current account 
surpluses being amassed in China, as sources also.  We consider the implications 
of the latter later in this Report.  Policy intervention also impacts, responding to 
the fact that multinationals are footloose and in the belief that inward investment 
not only brings direct benefits in the form of income and employment but also 
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spillover benefits to domestic enterprises in induced productivity growth.  As a 
result, national and regional agencies target policy at attracting FDI.  Again, we 
return to this later. 
 
Financial Market Integration 
 
FDI refers to what we usually think of as long-term capital flows.  Its growth and 
that of trade depends upon having efficient and deep financial markets.  Financial 
intermediation is clearly central to the development of any economic system and 
this is even more true of the global economy as of any individual national 
economy. 
 
There are no straightforward measures of financial market integration.  One 
indirect measure is turnover in foreign exchange markets, which we report in 
Table 4.  Two things are striking.  First, growth in turnover.  Over the last 15 
years, spot transactions have doubled and total transactions tripled.  Second the 
sheer scale of this activity:  average daily turnover is over $600 billion in spot 
transactions and almost $1,900 billion in total transactions.  There is of course a 
degree of concentration in this activity, with over 40 per cent of total transactions 
involving US dollars and around 50 per cent of activity being located in the UK 
and US.  Nonetheless, the market is broad as well as deep and involves activity 
located in a growing number of developing and transitional economies as well as 
smaller industrialised economies.  By 2004, almost 20 per cent of transactions 
were conducted in Asian markets, for example.  These trading volumes are quite 
extraordinary orders of magnitude, which give an indication of just how extensive 
financial intermediation is and how central it is to the globalisation process. 
 
Table 4:  Global Foreign Exchange Market Turnover1 
Daily averages in April, in billions of US dollars 
 
 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 
Spot transactions 317 394 494 568 387 621 
Outright forwards 27 58 97 128 131 208 
Foreign exchange swaps 190 324 546 734 656 944 
Estimated gaps in reporting 56 44 53 60 26 107 
Total ‘traditional’ turnover 590 820 1,190 1,490 1,200 1,880 
Memo: Turnover at April 
2004 exchange rates2 
650 840 1,120 1,590 1,380 1,880 
1 Adjusted for local and cross-border double-counting. 
2  Non-US dollar legs of foreign currency transactions were converted from current US 
dollar amounts into original currency amounts at average exchange rates for April of 
each survey year and then reconverted into US dollar amounts at average April 2004 
exchange rates. 
Source:  Bank for International Settlements 
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Cross-border Migration 
 
Migration contributes to the globalisation process by transferring workers from 
labour abundant to labour scarce economies and by underpinning and sustaining 
networks that then support the development of trade and investment.  Media 
interest in one side of the process, immigration, might lead the lay person to 
suppose it is the most important driver.  In fact, in the modern world it is probably 
the least important driver.  There have been times when emigration and 
immigration were very significant.  Thus in the late nineteenth century ‘old world 
countries’ like the UK, Germany and Spain were losing around 3 to 6 per cent of 
their population annually.  Inflows into receiving countries were even more 
dramatic, with immigration into the US in the 1890s amounting to 9 per cent of 
the population and 16 per cent in Australia.  Modern migration is just not on this 
scale:  in the US it is around 3 per cent per annum, in the UK around 2 per cent 
per annum.   
 
Historically the UK has adopted a fairly liberal stance towards migration.  
Notwithstanding the more sensitive post-11th September 2001 political 
environment, that liberal stance has been sustained, buoyed by a tight labour 
market and slow population growth.  As a result, total numbers have more than 
doubled since 1991, with almost 125,000 migrants being granted British 
citizenship in 2003.  It is widely acknowledged that migrant labour has an 
important role to play in relieving both high skill and low skill shortages, health 
professionals being an example of the former and ancillary workers in the services 
sector an example of the latter. 
 
It is hard to judge at this point what impact China and India’s growth will have on 
migration.  On the one hand there have been major diasporas from both 
historically; on the other hand, rising prosperity at home ought to be expected to 
stem the flow of economic migrants.  In the UK context, total migrants from India 
continue to grow, though their share in total inflows has declined by a third over 
the last decade, whilst those from China have increased fourfold in numbers and 
doubled their share.  Although actual flows do not seem to justify the media 
interest in migration, it will nonetheless continue to be an important driver of 
globalisation. 
 
 
3. CHINA AND INDIA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
 
 As we noted at the outset, China and India are growing very rapidly.  Since in 
both countries the growth in their trade has exceeded the growth of real output, 
they are also integrating rapidly into the world economy.  It is no exaggeration to 
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suggest that in historical terms their emergence may be one of the three biggest 
‘shocks’ to the world economy of the last 500 years, the other two being the 
Industrial Revolution and integration of the US economy.  In this Section we 
review a range of indicators of integration and comment on likely future trends. 
  
 Aggregate Exports 
 
 Between 1990 and 2004 merchandise exports grew globally by about 265 per cent 
(and hereafter in nominal terms).  Over the same period, China’s grew by 957 per 
cent and India’s by 405 per cent.  The transformation of these two large 
continental economies into major players, in the case of China into one of the 
leading exporters globally, has been fostered by changing internal and external 
conditions.  Both have substantially reformed and liberalised their trade regimes, 
in China’s case this being reinforced by WTO membership.  By liberalising their 
imports and increasing the incentive to produce for export markets, they have 
dramatically increased their capacity to produce and export goods for which their 
endowments of labour provide them with comparative advantage.  Simultaneously 
external conditions have been conducive to China and India taking full advantage 
of globalisation.  Trade barriers have fallen in manufactured goods in general in 
industrialised countries and this is particularly so in specific sectors, not least 
clothing and textiles with the dismantling of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, 
following the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations; though it should 
be noted that the speed of growth of China’s clothing and textiles exports has 
resulted in the re-introduction in 2005 by the EU of agreed, but allegedly 
temporary, quantitative restrictions.  Falling communication and transport costs 
have fostered also the fragmentation of international production and provided 
increased opportunities for domestic and multinational firms to take advantage of 
lower production costs for more labour-intensive stages of production, through 
outsourcing and relocation of production. 
 
 The pattern of change is similar for both China and India but the scale is 
dramatically different.  By 2004 China accounted for 6.5 per cent of world 
merchandise exports and India only 0.8 per cent (see appendix table A2).  For 
services this difference is much less marked.  China’s share of global services 
trade grew from 0.7 per cent in 1990 to 2.6 per cent in 2003, while India’s share 
grew over the same period from 0.6 per cent to 1.6 per cent.  China is now the 
fourth largest exporter globally and a recent OECD report forecasts it will be the 
largest by 2010.6 
 
 For both goods and services trade it is the growth rates that are so impressive by 
international standards (see Appendix Tables A5 and A6).  Of course, it is these 
double-digit growth rates (and the prospect of them being sustained into the 
                                                          
6 Economic Survey of China 2005 (OECD, Paris). 
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future) that excites such attention both in terms of the competitive challenges 
posed and economic opportunities offered to other countries in the Asia region 
and beyond.  In both countries average per-capita incomes are still sufficiently 
low and the pool of under-utilised labour sufficiently large to expect that output 
and export growth rates can be sustained for a long time to come.  Growing 
incomes and production will, however, bring with them increased demand for 
imported consumer, intermediate and capital goods but also alter the capacity to 
diversify further beyond labour-intensive goods. 
  
 Export Composition 
 
 The composition of China and India’s current exports are summarised in 
Appendix Tables A17, A19 and A20.  Manufactures are more dominant in China 
than India, though agricultural and natural resource exports are less important than 
manufactures.  In both countries, exports are concentrated in labour-intensive (e.g. 
textiles and clothing) and standardised processes.  But in both there is also clear 
evidence of some upgrading taking place, with the share of machinery and 
equipment in exports increasing.  If the experience of Japan and other Asian 
industrialising countries is to be a useful guide, then one can anticipate this 
upgrading from low- to high-skill labour intensive, and from standardised to more 
technologically intensive, processes (transportation equipment, chemicals, 
industrial machinery and consumer electronics) to continue.  The movement into 
high technology exports that use highly skilled labour and require substantial 
research and development (e.g. as in pharmaceuticals and precision instruments) 
should be slower, if other Asian experience is a guide.  But education quality and 
provision in both countries, especially in the higher education sector, is relatively 
good (given average per capita income) and one may therefore expect more rapid 
technological upgrading than in some of the other Asian economies.7 
 
 Import Growth and Composition 
 
 Tables A9 to A12 in the statistical appendix provide data on the growth and 
composition of imports of the two countries.  For both there has been a substantial 
growth of goods and services imports since 1990.  The ratio of imports (of goods 
and services) to GDP grew from 14.3 per cent in 1990 to 31.8 per cent in 2003 in 
China, and from 8.6 per cent to 16.0 per cent in India over the same period.  As 
already pointed out, this has been driven in part by the growth of income and 
production and corresponding growth in demand for final, intermediate and 
capital goods.  But trade policy reform has already played an influential role, as 
shown in Table 5 below.  The tariff data gives a guide to ease of market access at 
the border at least.  In China average tariffs for non-agricultural imports are less 
                                                          
7 Malaysia, for example, nearly doubled the share of medium and high technology exports in total 
exports in a decade, i.e. from 37% in 1985 to 69% in 1996 (see World Development Report, 2000). 
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than 10 per cent and not therefore significantly above tariff levels in the 
industrialised countries.  Average tariffs and tariff peaks are much higher in India 
(especially for agricultural imports) but India has significantly liberalised its non-
tariff barriers to imports. 
 
Table 5:  Tariffs in China and India Compared 
 
                       % 
Simple Average Rate Maximum Rates  
Agriculture Non-
Agriculture 
Agriculture Non-
Agriculture 
China 15.8 9.1 65 50 
India 114.5 34.3 300 150 
Source:  World Trade Report, 2005 
 
 Data on the composition of imports differs according to source but it is evident 
that for both countries a significant proportion of imports are capital or 
intermediate goods going into export activities.  Natural resource imports (oil and 
gas in particular) are also significant for both.  Although agricultural products 
account for a relatively small share of imports, it is anticipated that this will grow; 
in China through growing income and further specialisation effects8, and in India 
as pressure within the WTO to liberalise the agricultural sector increases, as it no 
doubt will quite quickly.   
 
 Direction of Trade 
 
 Chart 1 summarises the sources of India’s and China’s current imports and 
direction of their exports.  A greater proportion of China’s trade, both importing 
and exporting, is with the OECD.  This no doubt reflects the more rapid 
industrialisation in China and greater share of manufactures in both China’s 
imports and exports.  Interestingly, however, the EU share of India’s imports and 
exports is greater than that of China; geopolitical, language and historical factors 
may be relevant in accounting for the greater commercial linkages of the two 
countries with Europe and North America. 
 
 Turning specifically to the UK, its share of Indian imports is currently 4 per cent 
and just under 1 per cent of China’s.  In both, this share has declined over the last 
decade, from 5.4 per cent in India and 1.5 per cent in China. 
 
                                                          
8 In the case of China it must be recognised that there is a considerable gap in average incomes between 
the coastal regions and the rest of China.  The demand for consumer goods and services is already 
enormous in the coastal regions.  Further growth in demand can be expected as catching-up and efforts 
to reduce poverty and regional inequality occurs. 
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 Chart 1: Direction of India and China’s Trade (2003) 
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b)  Exports 
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 FDI Inflows and Outflows 
 
 Inward FDI has played a much greater role in opening the Chinese than the Indian 
economy.  On average China was the destination for about 10 per cent of the 
world’s FDI flows between 1992 and 1997.  Although it has accounted for a lower 
share since, it remains a major destination (about 6 per cent on average each year).  
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By contrast, the volume of FDI inflows in India have been much smaller (see 
Appendix Tables A25 and A26), accounting since 1992 for less than 1 per cent of 
FDI inflows in every year.  The export platform opportunities and business 
environment clearly appear much more attractive so far in China than India.  As a 
result, foreign involvement is more evident in the former than the latter.  In 2003 
over 12 per cent of gross capital formation in China was by foreign investors; for 
India the comparable percentage was only 4 per cent. 
  
 The liberalisation and development of these two economies is also marked by 
their emerging role as a provider of outward FDI.  Their shares of world FDI 
flows remain modest; less than 0.5 per cent in China and less than 0.2 per cent for 
India.  The amounts of overseas investment are, however, growing in absolute 
terms as domestic firms increase their links with foreign suppliers and 
international production chains and increase their overseas marketing and 
distribution capabilities. 
 
  
4. CHALLENGES FOR THE EAST MIDLANDS 
ECONOMY 
 
 As we have seen in the two previous Sections, the drivers of globalisation show 
no signs of abating.  In fact, with the emergence of China and India, and the 
continued march of new technology, the globalisation of economic activity will 
accelerate.  In the longer run this will almost certainly be associated with an 
increase in average living standards.  But to maximise the benefits of 
globalisation, we have to try to anticipate and adjust to its challenges in order to 
minimise frictions; whilst at the same time recognising and exploiting the 
opportunities it brings along.  In Section 5 we focus on the latter. 
 
 The sheer scale of the Chinese and Indian economies means they will pose a range 
of potentially acute challenges for the East Midlands economy.  We see these as 
taking one or more of the following forms: 
 
• direct import competition:  the displacement of local production by 
imports from China and India; 
• indirect import competition: the displacement of local production by 
outsourcing of activities to China and India; 
• direct export competition:  the displacement of exports from East Midlands 
enterprises by Chinese and Indian enterprises in third markets; 
• competition for inward investment:  the diversion of investment that would 
otherwise have come to the East Midlands, to China or India. 
 
 We evaluate each in turn. 
 20 
 
 
 Direct Import Competition:   
 
 As we have seen, aggregate imports from China and India to the EU and UK have 
grown rapidly and are expected to accelerate.  Insofar as there is direct 
competition between these imports and production of East Midlands enterprises, 
this represents a direct competitive threat.  In broad terms, the extent of this can be 
gauged by comparing the structure of exports from these two countries with the 
structure of production in the East Midlands, which we can glean from Tables 
A20, A22 and A24.  Data constraints are such that these are necessarily broad 
aggregates.  Nonetheless, what is clear is that the largest categories of exports 
from India are: handicrafts, engineering goods, garments, textiles and chemicals; 
those from China are machinery, electrical equipment and optical equipment, 
garments, textiles and metals.  As we know from the Regional Economic Strategy 
(EMDA 2003), the East Midlands economy is more dependent on manufactures 
than the national economy, thus it is clearly vulnerable in some of these 
categories.  Overall, they account for around 10 per cent of the region’s output and 
30 per cent if construction and services are excluded.  It is likely that the threat of 
direct displacement of production from increased imports will be sharpest in 
garments, textiles, engineering goods and metals. 
 
 Indirect Import Competition:   
 
 Outsourcing of production has accelerated rapidly over the last decade, partly due 
to falling trade costs and partly to the fragmentation of production processes.  This 
of course has been a calculated strategy on the part of many enterprises to deal 
with more intense competition, since outsourced processes invariably drive 
production to low wage economies.  As more developing countries liberalise, 
more opportunities are created for outsourcing, most notably to China and India. 
 
 This is clearly another competitive threat and potentially another source of 
displacement of activity currently located in the East Midlands.  And of course 
that threat starts from the East Midlands itself:  after all, one strategy for meeting 
direct competition from imports, or competition for exports in third markets, is to 
drive down labour costs by outsourcing.  Moreover, that threat should not be 
thought of as being specific to the manufacturing base.  It also applies to the 
region’s growing services sector:  overseas call centres are a form of outsourcing 
in the finance and business services and communications sectors, two of the 
fastest growing sectors in the region.  Although call centres in China do not 
represent a competitive threat, those in India do. 
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 Direct Export Competition:   
 
 As the Regional Economic Strategy (RES) document points out, the East 
Midlands is one of the UK’s more open regions, with exports amounting to 21.6 
per cent of gross value added in 2003, compared to an average of 19.2 per cent for 
the UK.  However, as in other regions of the UK, exports as a share of GVA have 
fallen since 2001, with slow growth in the Eurozone and Japan being the main 
driver of this. 
 
 Exporting activity is clearly a major contributor to regional economic activity and 
wealth creation.  It is clearly also a major source of employment.  Moreover, as 
recent research has shown, exporting is good for productivity.  For a wide range of 
countries, the evidence points very clearly to exporting firms enjoying a clear 
productivity advantage over non-exporting firms.  It is also the case that in the UK 
data there is some support for so-called learning by exporting.  In other words, 
enterprises learn from best practice internationally and productivity is boosted 
further by being in export markets.9 
 
 As we saw in Section 2, exports from China and India, especially the former, are 
growing very fast and this clearly represents a major competitive threat to East 
Midlands exporters in third country markets.  This is especially true of the United 
States, the UK’s biggest market and the market where Chinese exports are 
growing fastest.  Thus a key challenge to existing exporters will be in not losing 
market share to China and India. 
 
 Competition for Inward Investment:   
 
 Clearly any reduction in production due to displacement by imports or 
displacement of exports in third markets is likely to be associated with a decline in 
investment and investment is a core driver of growth.  In addition to that threat, 
there is also the possibility that new investment, which would otherwise have 
come into the East Midlands, whether from UK enterprises or non-UK 
multinationals, goes to China or India.  This would be against the backcloth of a 
decline in inward investment in recent years.  Thus in 2003 investment by UK 
owned companies in the region was equivalent to 5.6 per cent of GVA, down from 
8.5 per cent in 1998.  There has also been a decline in foreign owned companies, 
from 1.5 per cent of GVA in 1998 to 1.2 per cent in 2002.  It should however be 
noted that, given the slowdown in FDI globally over the last few years, there may 
be a cyclical element to this.  If so, as and when growth accelerates in the 
Eurozone, US and Japan, some upturn might be expected. 
                                                          
9 For a review of the evidence in general, see D. Greenaway and R. Kneller (2004); for evidence on the 
UK in particular, see S. Girma, D. Greenaway and R. Kneller (2004). 
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 However, as we noted earlier, FDI is footloose, with multinationals moving assets 
to exploit location specific resource advantages such as plentiful supplies of 
relatively cheap unskilled labour, deep pools of relatively skilled labour or access 
to large local markets.  China and India (especially the former) offer enormous 
advantages to multinationals seeking cheap unskilled labour and/or large local 
markets.  The East Midlands economy simply cannot hope to compete on these 
grounds and that represents a threat.  However, its flexible labour markets and 
proximity to a large pan-EU market do offer opportunities, as we discuss later and 
it will be vital to fine-tune policy where possible to exploit these. 
 
   
5. OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE EAST MIDLANDS 
ECONOMY 
 
The growth of production and incomes in two such highly populated countries 
must give rise to opportunities for expanding existing economic activities in the 
East Midlands and for creating new economic activities.  These include: 
 
• Scope for increased exports of goods and services directly from the East 
Midlands to China and India. 
 
• Scope for increased sales and production through increased indirect or 
third market exporting. 
 
• Scope for sustaining or increasing the competitiveness of existing sales in 
home or other export markets through outsourcing to India and China or 
accessing their lower cost intermediate inputs. 
 
• Scope for inward investment in the East Midlands from China and India. 
 
 Detailed product, market and investment opportunities analysis is beyond the 
scope of the present study.  We aim instead to consider the broad mapping of the 
East Midland’s production structure with Chinese and Indian trade structures to 
illustrate the above types of opportunities in general terms. 
 
 Direct Export Opportunities 
 
 In Section 3 we outlined the broad structure of China’s imports and considered 
how rapid growth was increasing demand for agricultural products and raw 
materials, and for intermediate inputs in more technologically advanced products.  
A relatively low level of border protection against imports was also identified.  
The East Midlands industrial structure is summarised in Table A24.  Over 23 per 
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cent of production is accounted for by agriculture and food, drink etc. Although 
imports of products form these sectors are still low in China (less than 4 per cent 
of commodity imports in 2003), this is a large market in absolute terms and it can 
be expected that growing incomes and growing demand for variety (combined 
with greater specialisation away from agriculture) will increase its share of food 
and agricultural imports. 
 
 A substantial proportion of China’s imports are of intermediate inputs of 
machinery and equipment and electrical goods.  Nearly 12 per cent of East 
Midlands production in 2004 was in these sectors.  There are clearly opportunities 
for East Midland producers to supply more skill- or technology-intensive 
components that can be assembled by lower wage Chinese manufacturers.  
Indeed, similar opportunities may exist across a wide range of East Midlands 
manufacturing (e.g. transport equipment, chemicals and pharmaceuticals).  
Equally, there may be services export opportunities in China, for example in 
business and financial services.  Opportunities for inward tourism will also grow 
as incomes grow and attitudes to foreign travel by the Chinese change.  In this 
particular regard, the University of Nottingham’s branch campus in Ningbo, 
China, and the twinning arrangements between the cities of Nottingham and 
Ningbo offer a unique shop window for the region. 
   
 Turning potential into increased sales, production and employment requires that 
productivity and competitiveness are at international levels.  But building 
commercial links also requires good information sources for East Midlands firms 
and support available for building commercial contacts and in overcoming 
language, cultural and business methods barriers.  (This type of policy support is 
discussed more fully in Section 6.) 
 
 Indirect and Third Market Exporting 
 
 Given the increasing interdependencies of regions and countries in an increasingly 
globalised world, the opportunities created by the growth and increasing openness 
of China and India do not only need to come about through direct routes.  East 
Midlands producers and service providers sell their goods and services to other 
regions in the UK and other countries besides China and India.  Where incomes 
increase in these regions or countries because of growing exports to China and 
India, there are additional sales opportunities to these regions and countries.  
Alternatively the East Midlands may be a source of intermediate and services 
inputs into activities in other regions and countries that are supplying the Chinese 
and Indian markets.  Growth in direct sales to China or India from non-East 
Midlands sources may as a result imply increased indirect exporting for the 
region. 
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 These types of indirect exporting or third market effects can be explored through 
input-output linkages of the East Midlands economy but also require forecasts of 
how China and India are changing incomes and production in other regions and 
countries of significance for the East Midlands.  Again such modelling is feasible 
but beyond the scope of the present study. 
 
 Outsourcing Opportunities 
 
 Outsourcing can be viewed as a threat or challenge, since it tends to take part of 
the value-added chain away from existing production sites.  Certainly one would 
anticipate further shifts towards lower wage economies like China and India of 
those stages of production or of business and consumer services that are relatively 
labour intensive (especially low skill intensive).  Equally, it may offer 
opportunities to sustain the competitiveness of other stages of production.  Rather 
than seeing the disappearance of all stages of production where vertical 
fragmentation or break-up of production processes is not possible, increasing 
competitiveness and international commercial engagement by China and India 
offers opportunities for East Midland businesses to look for cost-reducing 
outsourcing of specific stages of production.  Reduced international transaction 
(internet, phone, travel and transport) costs increase these opportunities but greater 
commercial engagement and trust are also required to ensure product reliability 
and consistency of delivery.   
 
 In addition to support with gaining information and developing commercial links, 
outsourcing opportunities may also give rise to the need for adjustment support 
measures.  Greater fragmentation of processes may require reorganisation of 
businesses, of production technologies and production line management and new 
managerial and technical skills.  Outsourcing opportunities imply new challenges 
to restructure within industries and within firms.  The types of support that may be 
required for this are considered further in Section 6. 
 
 Inward Investment Opportunities 
 
 As explained in Section 3, China in particular is beginning to export capital and 
acquire foreign direct investment.  It is not a major FDI provider as yet but is 
likely to become a much bigger player in future.  As China’s (and India’s) exports 
grow and diversify, there will be growing motives for these two giants to invest 
abroad.  Selling abroad requires a marketing and distribution capacity that Chinese 
and Indian exporters may want to control and manage directly.  We know from 
Japan’s post-war development that this was an important motive in the growth of 
Japanese outward investment.  Similarly, we know from Japanese experience that 
access to traditional business service suppliers encouraged financial institutions to 
follow Japanese firms’ distribution and production activities.  It may well be that 
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the Chinese and Indian models of business organisation are different from those of 
Japan but similar motives will exist. 
 
 In upgrading export products and technologies, Chinese and Indian enterprises are 
likely to engage more extensively and deeply in international production chains 
and collaborations.  Accessing knowledge or specific skills may also be through 
foreign acquisition.  In just the same way that firms in the East Midlands may 
have incentives to shift unskilled labour intensive stages of production to China, 
Chinese firms have an incentive to shift skilled or technology-intensive stages of 
production to where these factors are more abundant.  They could do this through 
outsourcing and arms length trade but may internalise this process through 
outward FDI.  Outward FDI could also be viewed by some as a defensive 
response to the threat of trade barriers.  Again there is evidence to suggest that 
some Japanese FDI in the US and EU was a response to actual or perceived trade 
barriers (including anti-dumping action) against rapidly growing Japanese exports.  
It is likely that similar pressures and motives for outward FDI will emerge as 
China and India’s share of world exports grow and this triggers defensive 
responses.  With regard to the latter, we have already noted the recent agreement 
on textiles and clothing.  It would be unwise to take assurances regarding the 
short-term nature of this voluntary export restraint at face value:  after all, the 
MFA started out as the ‘Short Term Agreement on Cotton Textiles’ in 1962!  This 
could offer a basis for encouraging Chinese manufacturers to set up in the region 
as a platform for supplying the broader EU market.  Moreover, restraints to 
market access are not confined to textiles and clothing.  Over the last ten years 
there have been over 400 anti-dumping initiations against China, with the largest 
proportion originating in the EU.  Almost a quarter of all initiations are against 
China and a very high proportion (75 per cent) lead to actual measures.  It is hard 
to see this changing, which may also provide a basis for encouraging barrier 
jumping FDI into the East Midlands. 
 
 Beyond barrier jumping sectors, it is difficult to be precise about which other 
sectors are most likely to be future recipients of foreign FDI from China and 
India, or at least to be competitors with other regions in the UK and EU for such 
inward FDI.  The previous discussion does suggest that important motives for 
investment would be access to foreign know-how and skills, or to support direct 
exporting activities and to access the wider EU market.  In which case one might 
anticipate the R&D intensive sectors or business and financial services sectors as 
the most likely targets for inward FDI (through either acquisition or greenfield 
development).  
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6. SUPPORTING ADJUSTMENT TO GLOBALISATION 
 
The previous two sections have identified challenges and opportunities associated 
with globalisation in general and the emergence of China and India as global 
economic players in particular.  The extent of those challenges and opportunities 
is not, however, independent of economic conditions and policies in the UK and 
East Midlands.  Further, it is not the case that the appropriate policies and 
conditions conducive to dealing with the challenges of globalisation are different 
to those required to take best advantage of the opportunities arising out of 
globalisation.  Adjusting to global sources of change and developing new 
economic activities or new ways of doing existing activities are two sides of the 
same coin.  Policies and economic institutions need to support adaptability and 
flexibility of business organisations, production processes and individuals 
working within businesses and on production lines.  There is a considerable 
amount of evidence from both developed and developing countries that policies 
that support rather than resist economic adjustment are more likely in the long run 
to foster growth in productivity, employment and incomes.  The Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement (and its predecessors) is a classic case in point:  the patchwork of 
quantitative restrictions in global textiles and clothing markets which were 
maintained for over 40 years only slowed adjustment, denying consumers access 
to cheap clothing but ultimately failing to save jobs. 
 
It is also important to recognise that in a dynamic economy globalisation is not the 
only source of churn, i.e. businesses declining and jobs relocating.  Nor indeed is 
it generally the most important source.  Other sources include changes in 
technology, changes in consumer demand, incompetent management and bad 
policy.  Research in the US and Europe suggests these account for 80-95 per cent 
of job turnover, with globalisation accounting for 5 to 20 per cent.  This does not 
mean that competition from China and India is irrelevant but it does mean we 
have to keep these pressures in perspective. 
 
Much of what creates or fosters an environment conducive to adjustment and 
change is determined at national level.  The stability and predictability of 
macroeconomic policies and conditions is, for instance, of vital importance to the 
willingness and ability of businesses and workers to make long-term investment 
decisions about new technologies and products and gaining new skills.  The 
presence of good infrastructure (for example, transport and communications) and 
effective institutions (for example, customs clearance processes and business 
development support) in promoting trade and inward investment are of similar 
importance.  The national environment in terms of industrial relations and of the 
types of social safety nets and labour retraining support measures is also of critical 
importance in fashioning the flexibility of labour markets and mobility of workers 
(mobility, that is, between jobs, skills and locations). 
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One issue in the context of this Report is whether there are ways in which policies 
and support at the regional level can add to the East Midlands’ ability to cope with 
adjustment and help create more benefits from globalisation in general and from 
the emergence of China and India in particular.  In designing the East Midlands’ 
strategic response to these two new global players, one needs to consider whether 
there are ways of: 
 
a) making the East Midlands labour markets and businesses more adaptable and 
flexible:  survey evidence confirms consistently that flexible labour markets 
are an attractor rather than deterrent for inward investment. 
b) promoting greater skills and technology-upgrading: as China and India cannot 
be beaten on wages of unskilled labour, upgrading and upskilling help 
minimise adjustment costs and maximise new opportunities. 
c) making the infrastructure and institutions in the East Midlands particularly 
helpful in supporting inward investment and promoting exports and 
engagement in international production activities:  as noted earlier, firms that 
globalise are higher productivity firms, promoting exporting and FDI is 
promoting productivity growth.  
d) providing better information about market opportunities in China and India:  
China and India offer huge potential but, because of distance and language, 
market intelligence is costly to acquire, especially for SMEs. 
e) promoting stronger commercial links between the East Midlands and these 
countries10:  given the importance of networks, activities that promote the 
region’s visibility, relative to competing regions, would pay dividends. 
f) Targeting sectors where China and India face trade barriers:  there are bound 
to be opportunities to take advantage of locating production in the East 
Midlands to access the wider EU market. 
 
 Clearly we cannot devise an action plan for the East Midlands but rather to point 
to areas (as above) where strategic thinking is required.  It is evident, however, 
given the recent and rapid nature of China and India’s entry on the world stage, 
that there will be a need to improve information and dissemination on commercial 
opportunities and challenges for increased promotional activity (promoting the 
East Midlands as a location and its goods and services) in these two countries and 
for support with increasing the capacity of the East Midlands to engage 
commercially with these countries (i.e. support with overcoming cultural, 
linguistic and legal/institutional barriers). 
 
 Some of these challenges can be addressed though existing infrastructure, for 
example by reviewing the current focus of, and investment in, promoting inward 
investment and the learning and skills agenda.  In addition, in developing this 
                                                          
10 These issues are also considered in some depth in  Martin (2005). 
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strategic thinking with regard to China and India, there are two distinctive features 
of the region that merit recognition, namely that: 
 
a) the East Midlands is home to a large number of people of Asian origin, with 
ongoing commercial engagement and contact with India in particular; the 
significance of this is that academic research highlights the importance of 
migration and kinship ties to establishing and sustaining trading networks 
b) universities in the region have a considerable amount of expertise (policy, 
analytical and language support) on China and a large number of Chinese 
students.  The University of Nottingham has also recently opened a branch 
campus in Ningbo, located in China’s fastest growing province.  Table 6 
below provides some information on the number of students from China and 
India at universities in the region. 
 
Table 6:  Overseas Students from China and India at East Midlands Universities 
 
a)        China 
Institution 2002-2003 2003-2004
De Montfort University 120 155
University of Derby 175 200
University of Leicester 380 535
University of Lincoln 105 35
Loughborough University 565 1010
University College, Northampton 75 150
Nottingham Trent University 115 215
University of Nottingham 875 1290
TOTAL 2410 3585
 
b) India 
Institution 2002-2003 2003-2004
De Montfort University 145 180
University of Derby 90 60
University of Leicester 60 80
University of Lincoln 145 30
Loughborough University 65 75
University College, Northampton 110 80
Nottingham Trent University 50 45
University of Nottingham 190 270
TOTAL 850 820
Source:  HESA 
 In both cases these offer access to resources, experience and skills.  With them 
come opportunities to lower cultural and linguistic barriers and promote 
commercial links and training opportunities.  The local community with 
experience of trading or commercial engagement with India could be drawn into 
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promotional activity.11  Similarly, Chinese students at universities in the region 
(there were over 3,500 in 2003/4) might be provided with opportunities to find out 
more about business activity in the region (e.g. through placement schemes).  
Workshops or conferences organised by EMDA on themes relating to East 
Midlands-China commercial interests might be held at the Ningbo campus.  This 
creates opportunities for specific training and for increasing awareness and 
experience of China and offers a means of connecting the region with what will 
before too long be the largest economy in the world. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The terms of reference for this Report asked us to do three things:  review the 
literature on the process of globalisation and development of China and India; 
evaluate available databases to illustrate the process of globalisation; and set out 
the challenges posed for the East Midlands. 
 
As we have seen, although globalisation is not a new phenomenon for either the 
world economy or the UK, the wave we have experienced over the last 30 years is 
distinctive both for its speed and reach.  Speed and reach will be extended with the 
emergence of China and India.  Although the globalisation process crates long run 
benefits by giving consumers access to a wider range of products, creating jobs, 
raising real incomes and so on, it does create adjustment frictions.  Import 
competition causes businesses to downsize or close, with consequent loss of jobs.  
But is also offers opportunities to develop new products and access new markets.  
Moreover, robust evidence shows that firms that globalise, whether by exporting 
or engaging in FDI, are more productive than those that do not.  The key 
challenge for the East Midlands economy will be to accelerate the pace of 
adjustment to change so that: resources are more rapidly re-deployed from failing 
to successful enterprises; the duration of unemployment during transitions is 
shortened; and new investment is attracted into the region. 
 
Successfully meeting these challenges will not be easy, because the region is in 
competition with other regions for investment and jobs.  That being so, the key to 
success will be in developing strategies which build on region specific advantages 
and aggressively marketing those advantages.
                                                          
11 There is a body of empirical evidence now that establishes the pro-trade creating effects of kinship 
ties and cross-country networks (J. E. Rauch (2001) and J. E. Rauch and V. Trindade (2002)). 
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APPENDIX:  SOURCES OF DATA ON 
GLOBALISATION FOR CHINA AND INDIA 
 
All of the major international agencies collect and publish information and data on 
globalisation processes, in most cases in both print and electronic format.  Clearly 
where one sources information depends upon the data being accessed. 
 
The OECD Handbook on Economic Globalisation Indicators (OECD 2005) is the 
most comprehensive source of information on potential globalisation concepts and 
their statistical counterparts.  It also provides information on data sources but does 
not offer much by way of data series themselves.  Information is available at 
www.oecd.org .   
 
Trade data is most reliably accessed through the World Trade Organisation’s 
International Trade Statistics, which is published annually and therefore yields a 
time series.  This is available on line at www.wto.org , back to 1998.  In addition 
to reporting aggregate data on imports and exports, it disaggregates to regional 
flows and broad commodity/service categories.  Trade flows of individual 
countries can also be tracked through this source. 
 
Data on trade barriers can be accessed through UNCTAD and the World Bank.  
The latter reports average tariffs on broad commodity aggregates on 
www.worldbank.org .  UNCTAD provides more detailed information on both 
tariff and non-tariff barriers in its TRAINS database (which is only available to 
subscribers).  The most comprehensive information on trade barriers and the 
commercial environment more generally is in the WTO’s Trade Policy Reviews.  
These are regular ‘audits’ of trade policy of WTO Members ranging from every 
two years for the US, EU and Japan, through to every seven years for the smallest 
Members.  They are only available on subscription.  As yet a Trade Policy Review 
has not been published for China; the last Review of India was in 2002. 
 
Data on cross-border investment is available through a number of sources.  The 
most comprehensive is the annual World Investment Report, published by the UN 
Centre for Transnational Corporations, www.unctc.unctad.org .  This reports 
investment inflows, outflows, inward stocks and outward stocks.  Moreover, 
information is disaggregated by region and country.  The series runs back to 1991. 
 
The most comprehensive and easily accessed information on production structures 
across countries and their evolution is the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators.  This is very comprehensive and available on-line.  Its annual 
supplement, the World Development Report is available on subscription.  Another 
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readily available source of country specific, comparative data is the CIA’s World 
Factbook, which is available on-line at www.cia.gov  
 
Information on migration is clearly collected by national authorities, though 
illegal immigration means that reported numbers understate actuals to a greater or 
lesser degree.  Comparative data is collected and disseminated by the Migration 
Policy Institute and its Global Data Centre is available on-line at:  
www.migrationinformation.org/GlobalData/ .  As well as reporting numbers on a 
comparative basis back to 1991, this also breaks down migrants by origin. 
 
The international organisations provide information and data on China and India.  
In addition, they regularly produce country specific analyses and reports.  The 
most comprehensive data source on China is the annual China Statistical 
Yearbook, prepared by the National Bureau of Statistics for China, details of 
which are at:  www.stats.gov.cn .  The equivalent publication for India is the 
Handbook of Statistics of the Indian Economy, published by the Reserve Bank of 
India, details at:  www.rbi.org.in/home.aspx .  Both publications report 
information on production, consumption, balance of payments and so on.   
 
Naturally, the emergence of China and India has stimulated considerable research 
activity in the academic community.  The two most targeted journals covering this 
literature are the China Economic Review and Journal of Asian Economics, whilst 
The World Economy is an excellent source of accessible analysis of policy 
developments. 
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Table A27: Annual percentage change of FDI inflows 
Table A28: FDI outflows (value) 
TableA29: Share of FDI outflows (%) 
Table A30: Annual percentage change of FDI outflows 
Table A31: FDI inward stock (value) 
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Table A1 : World Exports in Merchandises (Value) 
Unit : US dollar at current prices (100 millions)  
    
Reporter World China India 
1990 34,487 620 179 
1991 35,149 719 177 
1992 37,657 849 196 
1993 37,771 917 216 
1994 43,257 1,210 250 
1995 51,616 1,487 306 
1996 53,913 1,510 331 
1997 55,774 1,828 350 
1998 54,962 1,837 334 
1999 57,068 1,949 357 
2000 64,446 2,492 424 
2001 61,858 2,661 434 
2002 64,811 3,256 493 
2003 75,462 4,384 571 
2004 91,235 5,934 725 
Source: WTO    
 
 
Table A2: Share of World Exports in Merchandise(%) 
    
Reporter World China India 
1990 100 1.8 0.5 
1991 100 2.0 0.5 
1992 100 2.3 0.5 
1993 100 2.4 0.6 
1994 100 2.8 0.6 
1995 100 2.6 0.6 
1996 100 2.8 0.6 
1997 100 3.3 0.6 
1998 100 3.3 0.6 
1999 100 3.4 0.6 
2000 100 3.9 0.7 
2001 100 4.3 0.7 
2002 100 5.0 0.8 
2003 100 5.8 0.8 
2004 100 6.5 0.8 
Source: WTO; own calculation   
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Table A3: World Exports in Commercial Service(value) 
Unit: US dollar at current price(100 millions)  
    
Reporter World China India 
1990 7,084 57 46 
1991 8,282 69 49 
1992 9,222 91 49 
1993 9,394 110 50 
1994 10,360 164 60 
1995 11,893 184 68 
1996 12,781 206 72 
1997 13,295 245 89 
1998 13,507 239 111 
1999 13,979 262 140 
2000 14,852 301 175 
2001 14,906 329 208 
2002 15,923 394 233 
2003 18,050 464 280 
2004 20,997     
    
Source: WTO    
 
Table A4: Share of World Exports in Services(%) 
    
Reporter World China India 
1990 100 0.7 0.6 
1991 100 0.8 0.6 
1992 100 1.0 0.5 
1993 100 1.2 0.5 
1994 100 1.6 0.6 
1995 100 1.5 0.6 
1996 100 1.6 0.6 
1997 100 1.8 0.7 
1998 100 1.8 0.8 
1999 100 1.8 1.0 
2000 100 2.0 1.0 
2001 100 2.2 1.4 
2002 100 2.5 2.1 
2003 100 2.6 1.6 
2004 100     
Source: WTO; own calculation   
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Table A5: Annual Percentage Change of World Exports of Merchandise 
Goods 
    
    
Reporter World China India 
1990     
1991 1.9 1.6 -1.1 
1992 7.1 1.8 10.7 
1993 0.3 8.0 10.2 
1994 4.8 32.0 15.7 
1995 1.9 22.8 22.4 
1996 4.5 1.5 8.2 
1997 3.5 21.0 5.7 
1998 -1.4 0.5 -4.6 
1999 3.8 6.1 6.9 
2000 1.3 27.8 18.8 
2001 -4.0 6.8 2.4 
2002 4.8 22.3 13.6 
2003 1.6 34.6 15.8 
2004 2.1 35.4 27.0 
Source: WTO; own calculation   
    
 
Table A6 Annual Percentage Change of World Exports of Services 
    
Reporter World China India 
1990     
1991 6.1 21.0 6.5 
1992 11.3 31.9 0.0 
1993 1.9 20.9 2.0 
1994 10.3 49.1 20.0 
1995 14.8 12.0 13.3 
1996 7.5 12.0 5.9 
1997 4.0 18.9 23.6 
1998 1.6 -2.4 24.7 
1999 3.5 9.6 26.1 
2000 6.2 14.9 25.0 
2001 0.4 9.3 18.9 
2002 6.8 19.8 12.0 
2003 13.3 17.8 20.1 
2004 16.3     
Source: WTO; own calculation   
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Table A7: Share of World Exports in Merchandise(%); A Historical Look 
    
    
Reporter World China India 
1948 100 0.9 2.2 
1953 100 1.2 1.3 
1963 100 1.3 1.0 
1973 100 1.0 0.5 
1983 100 1.2 0.5 
1993 100 2.5 0.6 
2003 100 6.0 0.8 
    
Source: WTO    
 
 
Table A8: Share of World Imports in Merchandise(%); A 
Historical Look 
    
    
Reporter World China India 
1948 100 1.1 3.1 
1953 100 1.7 1.4 
1963 100 0.9 1.5 
1973 100 0.9 0.5 
1983 100 1.1 0.7 
1993 100 2.8 0.6 
2003 100 5.5 0.9 
    
Source: WTO    
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Table A9: Indicators for India(value)        
Unit: US dollar at current prices(100 millions)* unless stated otherwise       
* except FDI data in millions         
          
Indicators GDP  GDP 
 
Exports of 
Goods and 
Services Goods Exports Service Exports 
 
Imports of 
Goods  
and services Goods Imports
Services 
Imports 
FDI, net 
inflows 
(millions) 
FDI, by 
India 
(millions) 
  (constant) (current)              
1990 2,680 3,169 226 182 46 271 234 46 236 236 
1991 2,704 2,669 230 180 49 230 211 49 73 -0.04 
1992 2,847 2,442 219 200 49 238 229 67 276 -0.01 
1993 2,986 2,739 274 220 51 274 241 65 550 0.4 
1994 3,209 3,226 324 255 60 333 297 82 973 83 
1995 3,454 3,552 391 312 68 433 380 102 2,143 117 
1996 3,709 3,854 408 337 72 454 438 111 2,426 276 
1997 3,875 4,097 445 357 91 496 457 124 3,577 113 
1998 4,107 4,138 464 341 117 534 448 145 2,634 47 
1999 4,400 4,470 525 369 145 613 456 173 2,169 79 
2000 4,574 4,574 635 431 181 670 553 199 2,496 555 
2001 4,809 4,785 645 446 213 675 520 231 3,768 788 
2002 5,006 5,102 777 525 250 796 654 182 3,700 488 
2003 5,437 6,006 906 630 276 966 797 169 4,269 - 
Source: World Bank          
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Table A10: Indicators for India (annual percentage change)     
          
Indicators GDP  
Exports of 
Goods and 
Services 
Goods 
Exports 
Service 
Exports 
Imports of Goods 
and services 
Goods 
Imports 
Services 
Imports 
FDI, net 
inflows 
(millions) 
FDI, by India 
(millions) 
  (constant)              
1990                
1991 0.9 1.5 -1.1 6.5 -15.3 -10.0 -2.4 -69.0 ?? 
1992 5.3 -4.5 10.6 0.2 3.6 8.7 13.3 276.2 ?? 
1993 4.9 25.1 10.0 3.5 15.1 5.1 -3.5 99.1 ?? 
1994 7.4 17.8 15.9 18.2 21.6 23.1 26.2 76.8 20,605 
1995 7.6 20.8 22.4 12.2 29.9 27.9 25.2 120.2 41.0 
1996 7.4 4.4 8.0 6.8 4.7 15.3 8.8 13.2 135.9 
1997 4.5 8.9 5.8 25.9 9.4 4.4 22.4 47.5 -59.1 
1998 6.0 4.4 -4.6 28.3 7.7 -2.0 26.9 -26.4 -58.4 
1999 7.1 13.2 8.2 24.1 14.8 1.6 18.8 -17.7 68.1 
2000 3.9 20.9 17.0 25.3 9.3 21.4 15.4 15.1 602.5 
2001 5.1 1.5 3.4 17.3 0.7 -6.0 16.1 51.0 42.0 
2002 4.1 20.4 17.7 17.0 18.0 25.9 -21.3 -1.8 -38.1 
2003 8.6 16.6 19.9 10.6 21.3 21.8 -7.0 15.4 - 
Source: World Bank; own calculation only on FDI by China     
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Table A11: Indicators for India (% of GDP)   
     
Indicators Trade Trade in Goods Exports of Goods and Services Imports of Goods and services 
1990 15.7 13.1 7.1 8.6 
1991 17.2 14.3 8.6 8.6 
1992 18.7 17.7 9.0 9.8 
1993 20.0 16.2 10.0 10.0 
1994 20.4 16.1 10.0 10.3 
1995 23.2 18.4 11.0 12.2 
1996 22.4 18.4 10.6 11.8 
1997 23.0 18.7 10.9 12.1 
1998 24.1 18.5 11.2 12.9 
1999 25.5 20.5 11.8 13.7 
2000 28.5 19.6 13.9 14.6 
2001 27.6 13.5 13.5 14.1 
2002 30.8 15.2 15.2 15.6 
2003 30.5 14.5 14.5 16.0 
Source: World Bank     
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Table A12: Indicators for china (value)       
Unit: US dollar at current prices (100 millions) unless stated otherwise     
           
           
Indicators GDP  GDP 
Exports of 
Goods and 
Services Goods Exports Service Exports
Imports of 
Goods and 
services Goods Imports
Services 
Imports FDI, net inflows
FDI, by 
China 
  (constant) (current)              
1990 4,127 3,546 679 515 58 555 423 43 35 8 
1991 4,507 3,766 789 58 70 653 502 41 44 9 
1992 5,147 4,182 942 696 92 868 644 94 112 40 
1993 5,842 4,318 1,026 757 112 1,118 863 120 275 44 
1994 6,578 5,425 1,374 1,026 166 1,272 953 163 338 20 
1995 7,269 7,003 1,680 1,281 191 1,519 1,101 252 358 20 
1996 7,966 8,165 1,717 1,511 206 1,541 1,315 226 402 21 
1997 8,667 8,982 2,072 1,827 246 1,644 1,364 280 442 25 
1998 9,343 9,463 2,074 1,835 239 1,636 1,369 267 438 26 
1999 10,007 9,914 2,210 1,947 262 1,903 1,587 316 388 18 
2000 10,807 10,807 2,796 2,491 304 2,507 2,147 360 384 9 
2001 11,618 11,757 2,994 2,611 333 2,713 2,321 393 442 68 
2002 12,582 12,710 3,654 3,257 397 3,280 2,815 465 493 25 
2003 13,752 14,170 4,850 4,384 467 4,489 3,936 553 535 63 
Source: World Bank        
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Table A13: Indicators for china(annual percentage change)      
          
Indicators GDP  
Exports of 
Goods and 
Services 
Goods 
Exports 
Service 
Exports 
Imports of 
Goods and 
services Goods Imports Services Imports FDI,net inflows FDI, by China 
  (constant)                
1990                  
1991 9.2 16.1 14.4 19.2 17.7 18.5 -5.31 25.2 12.5 
1992 14.2 19.4 19.4 32.5 32.8 28.3 128.9 155.5 344.4 
1993 13.5 9.0 9.0 21.0 28.9 34.1 27.6 146.6 10.0 
1994 12.6 33.8 33.8 48.5 13.8 10.4 35.4 22.8 -54.5 
1995 10.5 22.3 22.3 15.1 19.4 15.5 54.8 6.1 0.0 
1996 9.6 2.2 2.2 7.7 1.5 19.5 -10.5 12.1 5.0 
1997 8.8 20.7 20.7 19.3 6.7 3.7 23.8 10.1 19.0 
1998 7.8 0.1 0.1 -2.7 -0.5 0.3 -4.6 -1.1 4.0 
1999 7.1 6.5 6.5 9.9 16.3 15.9 18.4 -11.4 -30.8 
2000 8.0 26.5 26.5 15.9 31.7 35.2 14.1 -0.9 -50.0 
2001 7.5 7.1 7.1 9.5 8.2 8.1 9.0 15.2 655.6 
2002 8.3 22.0 22.0 19.2 20.9 21.3 18.5 11.5 -63.2 
2003 9.3 32.7 32.7 17.6 36.9 39.9 18.9 8.5 152.0 
          
Source: World Bank; own calculation only on FDI by China      
 
 44 
 
 
Table A14: Indicators for China(% of GDP)   
     
Indicators Trade Trade in Goods Exports of Goods and Services Imports of Goods and services 
1990 31.9 32.5 17.5 14.3 
1991 35.5 36.0 19.4 16.1 
1992 37.5 39.6 19.5 18.0 
1993 35.7 45.3 17.1 18.6 
1994 48.8 43.6 25.3 23.4 
1995 45.7 40.1 24.0 21.7 
1996 39.9 35.5 21.0 18.9 
1997 41.4 36.2 23.1 18.3 
1998 39.2 34.2 21.9 17.3 
1999 41.5 36.4 22.3 19.2 
2000 49.1 43.9 25.9 23.2 
2001 48.5 43.3 25.5 23.1 
2002 54.8 48.8 28.9 25.9 
2003 66.1 60.1 34.3 31.8 
     
Source: World Bank     
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Table A15: India's trade(Direction of  Exports)           
Unit: US  dollar at current prices (millions)          
               
   Group 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
(1) OECD 10,248 10,337 11,209 12,648 15,443 17,705 18,601 19484 19,264 21,106 23,473 21,622 26,382 29,517 
1.1 EU 4,989 4,827 5,246 5,797 7,030 8,708 8,655 9,144 8,946 9,382 10,411 9,846 11,523 13,817 
1.2 North America 2,830 3,110 3,707 4,226 5,288 5,826 6,908 7,236 7,673 8,974 9,961 9,098 11,594 12,220 
1.3 Asia and Oceania 1,895 1,878 1,691 2,020 2,427 2,652 2,457 2,409 2,096 2,153 2263 1,991 2,436 2,376 
1.4 Other OECDs 535 522 565 605 698 519 581 696 547 597 838 687 830 1,103 
(2) OPEC 1,020 1,562 1,784 2,382 2,429 3,097 3,229 3,527 3,551 3,896 4,850 5,224 6,885 9,487 
(3) Eastern Europe 3,243 1,953 815 1,001 1,057 1,340 1,098 1,283 1,053 1,293 1,318 1,255 1,248 1,539 
(4) Developing Countries 3,099 3,587 4,236 5,798 6,969 9,198 10,036 10,312 9,221 10,460 13,013 13,536 17,862 22,557 
4.1 Asia  2,610 3,016 3,482 4,892 5,707 7,308 8,134 7,972 6,845 8,206 10,037 10,332 13,981 18,271 
4.2 Africa 394 441 567 661 878 1,513 1,421 1,638 1,762 1,555 1,956 2,261 2,576 3,053 
4.3 Latin America 95 130 188 244 385 378 481 702 615 700 1,018 942 1,306 1,234 
(5) Others 534.0 427.0 488.0 409.0 432.0 472.0 504.0 399.0 130.0 67.0 1,906 2,190 342 354 
Total trade 18,145 17,865 18,537 22,238 26,330 31,795 33,470 35,006 33,219 36,822 44,566 43,827 52,719 63,454 
               
Source: Handbook of statistics of Indian 
Economy            
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Table A16: India's trade (Source of Imports)           
Unit: US  dollar at current prices (millions)             
               
   Group 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
(1) OECD 13,773 10,522 12,269 13,084 1,732 19,209 19,457 21,336 21,860 21,364 20,158 20,614 23,301 28,953
1.1 EU 7,607 5,666 6,603 7,002 7,115 10,303 10,625 10,681 10,724 10,968 10,510 10,437 12,542 14,502
1.2 North America 3,235 2,275 2,553 2,971 3,171 4,243 3,999 4,138 4,026 3,944 3,412 3,679 5,015 5,453
1.3 Asia and Oceania 2,690 2,023 2,327 2,256 3,031 3,552 3,584 3,714 3,999 3,714 2,984 3,535 3,250 5,342
1.4 Other OECDs 782 559 787 855 1,415 1,112 1,248 2,803 3,111 2,738 3,251 2,990 2,500 3,656
(2) OPEC 3,924 3,821 4,777 5,222 6,050 7,644 10,143 9,404 7,765 12,850 2,689 2,966 2,500 3,656
(3) Eastern Europe 1,822 992 554 563 968 1,674 1,103 1,115 864 995 850 947 1,140 1,628
(4) Developing 
Countries 4,490 4,074 4,281 4,435 6,902 8,145 8,427 9,626 11,895 14,542 11,516 12,776 15,688 20,084
4.1 Asia  3,372 2,872 3,204 3,574 5,092 6,426 6,573 7,259 8,535 9,942 8,460 9,265 11,304 15,788
4.2 Africa 573 841 756 575 1,039 1,132 1,294 1,767 2,363 3,646 1,996 2,502 3,348 3,101
4.3 Latin America 546 361 321 287 772 587 560 601 725 936 701 1,009 1,036 1,195
(5) Others 2.9 1.4 0.3 2.6 2.6 3.0 3.8 3.9 4.4 4.4 15,683 14,084 17,804 20,778
Total trade 24,072 19,411 21,822 23,306 28,654 36,675 39,132 41,485 42,389 49,671 50,537 51,413 61,412 77,032
               
Source: Handbook of statistics of Indian Economy             
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Table A17: India's Exports of Principle Commodities    
Unit: US  dollar at current prices (millions)     
      
Commodity  Primary Products Manufactured Products Petroleum Products Others Total Exports 
1990 4,324 12,996 523 302 18,145 
1991 4,132 13,148 415 170 17,865 
1992 3,874 14,039 476 149 18,537 
1993 4,916 16,657 398 268 22,238 
1994 5,214 20,404 417 295 26,331 
1995 7,257 23,747 454 583 31,795 
1996 8,035 24,613 482 339 33,470 
1997 7,687 26,547 353 420 35,006 
1998 6,928 25,792 89 410 33,219 
1999 6,524 29,714 39 545 36,822 
2000 7,126 34,335 1,870 1,229 44,560 
2001 7,164 33,370 2,119 1,174 43,827 
2002 8,706 40,245 2,577 1,192 52,719 
2003 9,746 47,616 3,519 2,574 63,454 
      
Source: Handbook of Statistics of Indian Economy    
 
 48 
 
 
Table A18: India's Imports of Principal Commodities          
Unit: US  dollar at current prices (millions)            
              
Commodity 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
(1) Bulk Imports 10,848 8,563 9,830 9,112 11,321 14,314 16,365 14,970 13,230 19,646 20,816 20,263 24,300 29,371 
1.1 Petroleum, Crude and 
product 6,028 5,325 6,100 5,734 5,928 7,526 10,036 8,164 6,399 12,611 15,650 14,000 17,640 20,569 
1.2 Bulk consumption 
goods 557 275 507 327 1,144 970 1,214 1,483 2,524 2,417 1,443 2,043 2,411 3,059 
1.3 Other bulk items 4,263 2,963 3,223 3,032 4,249 5,819 5,115 5,143 4,307 4,618 3,722 4,220 4,249 5,742 
(2) Non-bulk imports 13,225 10,878 12,052 14,914 17,334 22,631 22,767 26,694 29,159 30,025 29,721 31,150 37,113 47,662 
2.1 Capital goods 5,836 4,233 4,523 6,243 7,638 10,330 9,922 9,796 10,064 8,966 8,491 9,882 13,498 17,132 
2.2 Mainly export related 
items 3,680 3,581 4,148 4,388 4,317 5,275 6,138 6,913 7,131 9,117 8,059 8,260 10,314 12,699 
2.3 Others 3,709 3,034 3,372 3,564 5,379 6,773 6,707 9,985 11,963 11,942 12,721 13,008 13,301 17,831 
Total Imports 24,072 19,410 21,882 23,306 28,654 36,675 39,132 41,485 42,389 49,671 50,537 51,413 61,412 77,032 
Source: Handbook of Statistics of Indian Economy           
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Table A19: India's Exports in Manufactured Goods            
Unit: US  dollar at current prices (millions)        
           
Commodity 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Leather and manufactures 1,149 1,269 1,278 1,299 1,611 1,752 1,606 1,657 1,661 1,590 1,944 1,910 1,848 2,025 
Chemical and allied 
products 1,307 1,479 1,229 1,478 1,956 2,359 2,690 3,170 2,906 3,409 4,034 4,080 5,035 6,006 
Plastic and linoleum 
products  111 112 149 336 47 585 539 514 471 604 915 987 1,222 1,739 
Rubber, glass, paints, 
enamels and products  297 270 396 524 619 642 671 697 614 680 937 985 1,198 1,484 
Engineering goods  2,250 2,253 2,480 3,038 3,508 4,391 4,963 5,336 4,464 5,152 6,819 6,958 9,033 12,213 
Readymade garments 2,236 2,199 2,393 2,586 3,282 3,676 3,753 3,876 4,365 4,765 5,569 5,007 5,690 6,088 
Textile yarn, fabrics, 
made-ups, etc. 1,540 1,804 1,900 2,140 3,045 3,523 4,057 4,355 3,725 4,189 4,889 4,468 5,085 5,511 
Jute manufactures 166 159 123 124 151 186 155 187 138 126 151 128 188 232 
Coir and manufactures 27 29 31 41 55 63 61 69 75 46 48 62 73 78 
Handicrafts 2,924 2,738 3,072 3,996 4,500 6,129 5,665 6,282 6,972 8,670 8,492 8,230 10,216 11,495 
Sports goods 48 32 35 45 66 74 78 81 73 67 65 69 73 93 
Others 127 156 241 277 307 367 375 323 327 418 472 486 583 651 
           
Source: Handbook of Statistics of Indian Economy             
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Table A20: China’s Structure of Exports (Commodities Only) 
 
Years: 2002, 2003 
 
 Exports (%) 
 2002 2003 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 3.3 2.9 
Oil and Gas Extraction + Fuel Refining NA NA 
Other Mining NA NA 
Gas, Electricity and Water NA NA 
Chemicals 4.5 4.2 
Minerals 4.7 4.5 
Metals 6.7 6.5 
Machinery and Equipment + Electrical and Optical Equipment 38.5 42.4 
Transport Equipment 3.2 3.5 
Food, Drink and Tobacco 2.1 1.8 
Textile and Clothing 17.8 16.7 
Wood and Wood Products 1.1 1.0 
Paper, Printing and Publishing 0.7 0.7 
Rubber and Plastics 3.1 2.9 
Other  Manufacturing NEC 14.3 12.9 
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Table A21: China’s Structure of Imports (Commodities Only) 
 
Years: 2002, 2003 
 
 Imports (%) 
 2002 2003 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 2.3 2.5 
Oil and Gas Extraction + Fuel Refining NA NA 
Other Mining NA NA 
Gas, Electricity and Water NA NA 
Chemicals 8.2 7.7 
Minerals 9.0 9.8 
Metals 9.3 10.0 
Machinery and Equipment + Electrical and Optical Equipment 47.4 48.9 
Transport Equipment 3.9 4.3 
Food, Drink and Tobacco 1.2 1.2 
Textile and Clothing 5.8 4.7 
Wood and Wood Products 1.4 1.1 
Paper, Printing and Publishing 2.5 2.1 
Rubber and Plastics 6.7 6.0 
Other  Manufacturing NEC 2.2 1.8 
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Table A22: India’s Structure of Exports (Commodities Only) 
 
Years: 2002, 2003 
 
 Exports (%) 
 2002 2003 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 8.0 6.4 
Oil and Gas Extraction + Fuel Refining 4.9 5.5 
Other Mining NA NA 
Gas, Electricity and Water NA NA 
Chemicals 9.6 9.5 
Minerals 20.9 20.2 
Metals NA NA 
Machinery and Equipment + Electrical and Optical Equipment 
+ Transport Equipment 17.1 19.2 
Food, Drink and Tobacco 4.7 4.9 
Textile and Clothing 21.2 19.1 
Wood and Wood Products NA NA 
Paper, Printing and Publishing NA NA 
Rubber and Plastics 4.6 5.1 
Other  Manufacturing NEC 7.5 8.9 
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Table A23: India’s Structure of Imports (Commodities Only) 
 
Years: 2002, 2003 
 
 Imports (%) 
 2002 2003 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 4.3 4.3 
Oil and Gas Extraction + Fuel Refining 28.7 26.7 
Other Mining 2.0 1.8 
Gas, Electricity and Water NA NA 
Chemicals 5.5 6.7 
Minerals 11.9 11.3 
Metals 4.2 5.0 
Machinery and Equipment + Electrical and Optical Equipment 19.9 20.2 
Transport Equipment 3.1 2.8 
Food, Drink and Tobacco 0.0 0.0 
Textile and Clothing 1.6 1.6 
Wood and Wood Products NA NA 
Paper, Printing and Publishing 1.3 1.4 
Rubber and Plastics 1.6 1.8 
Other  Manufacturing NEC 15.8 16.5 
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Table A24: East Midlands’ Industrial Structure (Construction and Service not Included) 
 
Year: 2004 
 
 Output (%) 
 East Midlands UK 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 5.9 4.7 
Oil and Gas Extraction + Fuel Refining 0.7 11.3 
Other Mining 1.5 0.9 
Gas, Electricity and Water 6.6 8.5 
Chemicals 7.4 8.9 
Minerals 5.1 2.8 
Metals 9.9 7.5 
Machinery and Equipment + Electrical and Optical Equipment 11.8 14.1 
Transport Equipment 12.9 8.9 
Food, Drink and Tobacco 17.6 11.3 
Textile and Clothing 4.0 2.3 
Wood and Wood Products 1.5 1.4 
Paper, Printing and Publishing 7.0 10.3 
Rubber and Plastics 4.4 3.8 
Other  Manufacturing NEC 3.7 3.3 
 
 
 55 
 
Notes on TableA20 – A24 
 
 
(1) The years for China’s and India’s structure of exports and imports are different 
from East Midlands’ industry.  
 China and India; 2002 and 2003 
 East Midlands; 2004 
 
(2) In table A24, Industrial Structure is slightly different from Chart 10. 
 Construction and service are excluded. 
 Oil & gas extraction is combined with fuel refining. 
 Machinery & equipment is combined with electrical & optical 
equipment. 
 
(3) Following (2), the reason for doing this is so that a mapping between East 
Midlands’ industrial structure and structure of China’s and India’s trade can be made. 
 
(4) The systems for India’s exports and imports are different.  
 
(5) In table A22, transport equipment is combined with machinery, electrical and 
optical equipment.  
 
(6) In table A23, the numbers for food, drink and tobacco is curious. This may be 
because the India’s system includes this into other categories (e.g. agriculture or other 
products). 
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Table A25: FDI inflows(value)   
Unit: US dollar at current prices(millions)    
    
Reporter World China India 
1992-1997(annual average) 310,879 32,799 1,676 
1998 690,905 45,463 2,633 
1999 1,086,750 40,319 2,618 
2000 1,387,953 40,715 2,319 
2001 817,574 46,878 3,403 
2002 678,751 52,743 3,449 
2003 559,576 53,505 4,269 
Source: UNCTAD    
 
 
Table A26: Share of FDI inflows(%)    
    
Reporter World China India 
1992-1997(annual average) 100 10.6 0.5 
1998 100 6.6 0.4 
1999 100 3.7 0.2 
2000 100 2.9 0.2 
2001 100 6.9 0.4 
2002 100 7.8 0.5 
2003 100 9.6 0.8 
Source: UNCTAD; own calculation    
 
 
Table A27: Annual percentage change of FDI inflows   
    
Reporter World China India 
1992-1997(annual average)       
1998       
1999 57.3 -11.3 -17.7 
2000 27.7 1.1 7.0 
2001 -41.1 15.1 46.7 
2002 -17.0 12.5 1.4 
2003 -17.6 1.4 23.8 
Source: UNCTAD; own calculation    
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Table A28: FDI outflows(value)    
Unit: US dollar at current prices(millions)   
    
Reporter World China India 
1992-1997(annual average) 328,248 2,846 96 
1998 687,240 2,634 47 
1999 1,092,838 1,775 80 
2000 1,186,838 916 509 
2001 721,501 6,884 1,397 
2002 596,487 2,518 1,107 
2003 612,201 1,800 913 
Source: UNCTAD    
 
 
TableA29: Share of FDI outflows(%)   
    
Reporter World China India 
1992-1997(annual average) 100 0.9 0.0 
1998 100 0.4 0.0 
1999 100 0.2 0.0 
2000 100 0.1 0.0 
2001 100 1.0 0.2 
2002 100 0.4 0.2 
2003 100 0.3 0.1 
Source: UNCTAD; own calculation   
 
 
 
Table A30: Annual percentage change of FDI outflows  
    
Reporter World China India 
1992-1997(annual average)       
1998       
1999 59.0 -32.6 70.2 
2000 8.7 -48.4 536.3 
2001 -39.2 651.5 174.5 
2002 -17.3 -63.4 -20.8 
2003 2.7 -28.5 -17.5 
Source: UNCTAD; own calculation   
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Table A31: FDI inward stock(value)   
Unit: US dollar at current prices(millions)   
    
Reporter World China India 
1980 692,714 1,077 452 
1985 972,205 6,063 747 
1990 1,950,303 20,694 1,657 
1995 2,992,068 134,869 5,641 
2000 6,089,884 348,346 17,517 
2002 7,371,554 447,966 25,408 
2003 8,245,074 501,471 30,827 
Source: UNCTAD    
 
 
Table A32: Share of FDI inward stock(%)   
    
Reporter World China India 
1980 100 0.2 0.1 
1985 100 0.6 0.1 
1990 100 1.1 0.1 
1995 100 4.5 0.2 
2000 100 5.7 0.3 
2002 100 6.1 0.3 
2003 100 6.1 0.4 
Source: UNCTAD; own calculation   
 
 
Table A33: FDI outward Stock(value)   
Unit: US dollar at current prices(millions)   
    
Reporter World China India 
1980 559,629   4 
1985 738,809 131 19 
1990 1,758,216 2,489 50 
1995 2,897,574 15,802 264 
2000 5,983,342 25,804 1,859 
2002 7,209,582 35,206 4,006 
2003 8,196,863 37,006 5,054 
    
Source: UNCTAD    
 
 
 59 
 
 
Table A34: Share of FDI outward stock(%)   
    
Reporter World China India 
1980 100   0.0 
1985 100 0.0 0.0 
1990 100 0.1 0.0 
1995 100 0.5 0.0 
2000 100 0.4 0.0 
2002 100 0.5 0.1 
2003 100 0.5 0.1 
Source: UNCTAD; own calculation   
 
 
Table A35: Inward FDI stock(% of GDP)   
    
Reporter World China India 
1980 6.6 0.5 0.2 
1985 8.3 2.0 0.3 
1990 9.3 5.8 0.5 
1995 10.2 19.3 1.6 
2000 19.3 32.2 3.8 
2002 23.0 35.4 5.2 
2003 22.9 35.6 5.4 
Source: UNCTAD    
 
 
Table A36: Outward FDI Stock (% of GDP)  
    
Reporter World China India 
1980 5.8   0.0 
1985 6.6 0.0 0.0 
1990 8.6 0.7 0.0 
1995 10.0 2.3 0.1 
2000 19.1 2.4 0.4 
2002 22.6 2.8 0.8 
2003 23.0 2.6 0.9 
Source: UNCTAD    
 
 
